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Judicial politics in the 
Judicial Committee
by Aidan O'Neill QC
How a Scottish takeover of English law in matters of Convention rights has seen the House of 
Lords superseded as the final court of appeal.
B etween October 2000 and February 2001 four decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, acting for the first time under its7 o
devolution jurisdiction, were pronounced. All of these 
cases came from Scotland on appeal from decisions of the 
High Court of Justiciary sitting in Edinburgh as a court of 
criminal appeal. The Scottish criminal appeal court has, 
throughout its history, been a court of final instance with 
no possibility of further appeal against any of its decisions 
to the House of Lords. Paragraph 13 (a) of Schedule 6 to 
the Scotland Act 1998, however, introduced for the first 
time the possibility of an appeal against decisions of the 
Scottish criminal appeal court to the Privy Council, either 
with leave of the Scottish court or, failing such leave, with 
special leave of the Judicial Committee. The four cases, 
which have now gone to the Judicial Committee from 
Scotland, are, chronologically:
(i) Montgomery and Coulter v Her Majesty's Advocate and the 
Advocate GeneralJor Scotland ]CPC 200 SLT 37 (accessible 
at www.privy-council.org.uk/ and digested in [2000] 
Times Law Reports 867): an appeal by the two accused in 
the second Surjit Singh Chhokar murder trial against a
decision by the High Court of Justiciary, acting as thej o J y o
Scottish criminal appeal court, to refuse their claim that 
the extent of their pre-trial publicity (resulting in part 
from a public dispute between Lord McCluskey the trial 
judge in the first Chhokar Singh trial and the then Lord 
Advocate, Lord Hardie of Blackford, over the propriety 
of the Crown deciding against putting all three suspects 
for the murder on trial together) was such as to deprive 
them of the possibility of a fair trial;
(ii) Hoekstra and others v Her Majesty's Advocate (No. 4) [2000] 
3 WLR 1817, JCPC (also accessible at www.privy- 
council.org.uk/): an application by th^ accused for 
special leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the 
decision of the High Court in Hoekstra and others v Her 
Majesty's Advocate (No. 3), HCJ, 2000 SCCR 676 
(chaired by the Lord Justice General, Lord Rodger of
Earlsferry), to refuse their application to set aside as 
ultra vires that Court's earlier decision in Hoekstra and 
others v Her Majesty's Advocate (No. 2), 2000 SLT 605, 
HCJ, to order the quashing of the interlocutors of a 
differently constituted High Court (chaired by Lord 
McCluskey in Hoekstra and others v. Her Majesty's Advocate 
(No. 1), 2000 SLT 602, HCJ). The second High Court 
had quashed the orders of the first High Court on the 
grounds that these had been pronounced by a court, 
which, by reason of Lord McCluskey's trenchantly 
expressed public views on the wisdom of the 
incorporation of the European Convention, could not 
be said to have been properly constituted by three 
impartial judges;
(iii) Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline), 2000 SLT 
59, JCPC (also accessible at www.privy- 
council.org.uk/): an appeal by the Crown against the 
decision of the High Court of Justiciary (again acting 
under the chairmanship of the Lord Justice General in 
its appellate jurisdiction in Brown v Stott (Procurator 
Fiscal, Dunfermline), 2000 SLT 379, HCJ), to uphold the 
accused's claim that the proposal by the Crown to lead 
and rely in court upon evidence of the admission which 
she was compelled to make to the police under section 
172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 contravened her 
Convention right against self-incrimination; and
(iv) HM Advocate v. McIntosh,]CPC, unreported, 5 February 
2001 (accessible atwww.privy-council.org.uk/): again a 
Crown appeal against a decision of the Scottish 
criminal appeal court consisting of Lord Prosser, Lord 
Kirkwood and Lord Allanbridge in which a majority of 
the court (Lord Kirkwood dissenting) found that the 
assumptions set out in section 3(2) of the Proceeds of 
Crime (Scotland) Act 1995, relating to the recovery of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking, were incompatible with 
the presumption of innocence set out in Article 6(2) 
ECHR (see Mclntosh v HM Advocate, 2000 SLT 1280, 
HCJ, also accessible atwww.scotcourts.gov.uk/).
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All of these appeals concerned aspects of the fair trial 
provision of the Convention, Article 6. The accused's 
appeal in Montgomery v Coulter was unsuccessful, it being 
held by the Judicial Committee that the High Court of 
Justiciary was correct in its assessment of the effect of the 
pre-trial publicity in this case as not being such as to 
prejudice the possibility of the two accused receiving a fair 
trial. The applicants for special leave in Hoekstra (No. 4) 
were also unsuccessful, with the Judicial Committee again 
agreeing with the High Court that the accused's 
applications raised no devolution issues properly so called, 
and that therefore there was no avenue of appeal to the 
Judicial Committee available under the Scotland Act 1998. 
By contrast, in Brown v Stott, the Crown appeal against the 
decision of the High Court of Justiciary was successful, it 
being held that any right against self-incrimination in the
O J O o
Convention was not an absolute one, but was instead a 
right which could lawfully be limited, provided that such 
limitation were proportionate and not such as to 
compromise an accused's right to a fair trial overall: in the 
context of road traffic prosecutions, the Judicial 
Committee held that considerations of the public interest 
could justify the Crown leading in evidence the accused's 
self-incriminating statement, notwithstanding that it was 
required of her by the police under threat of prosecution. 
And in HM Advocate v Mclntosh the Crown appeal was again 
successful, with the Judicial Committee overruling the 
majority decision of the Scottish criminal appeal court and 
holding that the property confiscation proceedings did not 
constitute a separate criminal charge. Accordingly the 
Judicial Committee held that the presumption of 
innocence set out in Article 6(2) was neither applicable or 
relevant to the prosecutor's application for a confiscation 
order (overruling on this point also the decision of the 
Court of Appeal Criminal Division of England and Wales 
in R v Karl Benjafield and others, unreported, 21 December 
2000 at paragraph 69 - also digested in [2000] Times Law 
Reports 902), albeit that the accused might still rely, in such 
proceedings, on the general fairness protections set out at 
common law and under Article 6(1). In any event, the 
Judicial Committee reiterated their view as set out in Brown 
v Stott and by the House of Lords in R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, ex pane Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, to the effect 
that the presumption of innocence contained in Article 
6(2) was not an absolute right but one which might 
properly be subject to a balancing test against the general 
interest of the community in suppressing crime.
The specific decisions of the Judicial Committee on the 
merits of each of these cases were unanimous: all are of 
interest and all raise important issues of law and legal 
interpretation, which deserve full consideration. It is 
particularly noteworthy that in all four of its decisions, the 
Judicial Committee found in favour of the narrower 
interpretation of Convention rights and against the 
arguments of each of the individual applicants. For a 
critical analysis of the reasoning and substantive decision
J O
reached by the Privy Council in Broivn v Stott, see S Di Rollo 
'Brown v Stott: an unconventional approach' 2001 Scots 
Law Times (News) 22. More generally, however, the four 
decisions, and the manner in which they appear to have 
been reached, highlight some fundamental aspects of the 
new constitution of the United Kingdom which the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the Devolution Statutes, in particular 
the Scotland Act 1998, have created. It is on these general 
constitutional aspects that this present article will 
concentrate.
THE DEFINITION OF A 'DEVOLUTION 
ISSUE'
The first thing that should be noted is that the one 
constant factor in all of the decisions of the Privy Council to 
date, acting under its Devolution jurisdiction, has been the 
presence of the two Scots judges in the House of Lords, Lord 
Hope of Craighead and Lord Clyde, on the panel of judges 
considering these matters. This is perhaps unsurprising, 
given that all of these cases to date have emanated from 
Scotland, but it is suggested that this continuity of personnel 
is a factor of particular significance when coming to consider 
the impact of these decisions on the constitutional 
development of the United Kingdom, post-devolution.
In Montgomery and Coulter v Her Majesty's Advocate and the 
Advocate General for Scotland, the Judicial Committee was 
composed in the traditional manner one now expects of 
Scottish appeals to the House of Lords, namely by two 
Scottish judges (Lord Hope and Lord Clyde) together with 
diree non-Scots (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead and Lord Hoffmann). However, a clear 
division of opinion arose among these judges as to whether 
or not a decision of the Lord Advocate to initiate criminal 
proceedings on indictment against the accused could 
properly be said to raise a devolution issue at all. The non- 
Scots judges, led by Lord Hoffmann, clearly were of the 
view that the matter of respect for and enforcement of an 
individual's Article 6 rights to a fair trial was not a matter
o
for a prosecutor, but lay wholly with the court before 
which the trial was to be conducted. Accordingly, they 
tended to the view that one could not take the Article 6 fair 
trial point against the prosecutor, particularly before the 
trial has actually started.
The Scottish law lords by contrast, emphasised the 
peculiar role and history of the Lord Advocate, noting his 
status as 'master of the instance' in criminal trials and 
insisting that the approach which the Scotland Act 1998 had 
taken was to make the right of the accused to receive a fair
o
trial a responsibility of the Lord Advocate as well as of the 
court. Lord Hope relied in part on the following passage 
from Hume's Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting 
Crimes (1844) vol II, 134:
'The Lord Advocate is master of his instance in this other sense, 
that even after he has brought his libel into court, it is a matter
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of his direction, to what extent he will insist against the panel; 
and he mayjreely, at any period of the process, before return of 
the verdict, nay after it has been returned, restrict his libel to an 
arbitrary punishment, in the clearest case, even of a capital 
crime'.
In what appears to be an implicit rebuke to Lord 
Hoffmann, Lord Hope noted that this case was the first 
time in which an appeal on a matter of Scots criminal law 
and procedure had ever come before a court situated 
outside Scotland; he therefore stressed the need for all the 
judges of that court to think themselves into the history 
and modes of understanding of Scots criminal lawyers, 
rather than simply for the judges to assume that the 
Scottish criminal system mirrored English criminal and 
the Lnglish-derived criminal legal systems.
The matter at stake was clearly one of the highest generalJ o o
constitutional importance. If Lord Hoffmann's view were 
to prevail and questions regarding the proper protection of 
Article 6 did not raise devolution issues (since they 
concerned only the acts of the courts rather than the 
devolved Lord Advocate), then two consequences 
followed: firstly, it would appear that all of the Scottish 
jurisprudence on the Lord Advocate's duties under Article 
6 - notably HM Advocate v little 1999 SLT 1145 on the 
Lord Advocate's delays in bringing a case to trial; Starrs and 
another v. Ruxton (Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow), 2000 JC 208, 
on temporary sheriffs; Hoekstra and others v HM Advocate 
(No, 2), 2000 SLT 605, on the requirements of an 
impartial judiciary; Buchanan (Procurator Fiscal, Fort William) 
vMclean 2000 SLT 928, HCL on fixed fees, criminal legal
' J ' ' O
aid and the equality of arms; Procurator Fiscal, Kirkcaldy v 
Kelly, HCJ, unreported, 18 August 2000, accessible at 
www.scotcourts.gov.uk/, on District Courts and the 
appearance of independence; and Mclntosh v HM Advocate, 
2000 SLT 1280, HCJ, on the incompatibility the 
presumption of innocence, set in Article 6(2) ECHR, of 
the procedures for the confiscation of the assets of 
convicted drug traffickers   which had developed since 
the coming into force of the Scotland Act and prior to the 
implementation of the Human Rights Act had been 
decided on the wrong statutory basis (see Angus Stewart 
QC 'Devolution Issues and Human Rights', 2000 Scots Law 
Times (News) 239 for a detailed argument to the effect that 
the legislation has indeed been misunderstood and 
misapplied by the judges and that the Scotland Act 1998 was 
never intended to be used to raise human rights points in 
the context of ordinary criminal procedure); secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, there would effectively be no 
role for the Judicial Committee in deciding on the proper 
interpretation and application of Convention fair trial 
rights within the context of Scottish criminal procedure. 
There would be no space for the Judicial Committee to 
carry out its envisaged constitutional function of ensuring 
a uniform UK wide interpretation for Convention rights in 
matters of both criminal and civil law. The result of this
could well be the development of a peculiarly Scottish 
Convention rights jurisprudence in criminal matters, since 
there remains no appeal from the High Court of Justiciary 
to the House of Lords on 'pure' human rights challenges 
which might be brought in the Scottish criminal courts 
under the Human Paghts Act 1998. The non-availability of 
appeals from the Scottish Criminal Courts to the House of 
Lords was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mackintosh 
v Lord Advocate (1876) 2 App Cas 41 and most recently 
statutorily re-affirmed by section 124(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (as amended).
In the event, since all the judges in Montgomery and Coulter 
were agreed that the appeal should be dismissed on the 
basis that the facts did not show any potential breach of the 
accused's fair trial rights, the non-Scots judges did not find 
it was not necessary for them to reach any final decision to 
be reached on the point as to whether a devolution issue 
had properly been raised as regards the applicability of 
Article 6 to the acts and omissions of the Lord Advocate, 
leaving the point to be argued and resolved on another
occasion.
In Hoekstra (No. 4) the three-judge screening committeeJo o
of the Privy Council, composed of Lord Slynn, Lord Hope 
and Lord Clyde, had little difficulty in rejecting the 
accused's application for special leave to appeal, with Lord 
Hope, delivering the Judgment of the Board, noting that 
the Judicial Committee was not a constitutional court of 
general jurisdiction and re-affirming that it could only hear 
appeals from Scotland wrhich raised a devolution issue as 
defined under the Scotland Act 1998. In all other issues, 
every interlocutor of the High Court of Justiciary is final 
and conclusive and is not subject to review by any court 
whatsoever. Thus, where it was alleged that the judges of 
the High Court of Justiciary had acted unlawfully, this did 
not give rise to an issue which the Judicial Committee 
could adjudicate on, since such an allegation, although 
raising a constitutional point, did not raise a Scotland Act 
1998 point. The limits within which the powers of the 
High Court of Justiciary may be exercised were said by 
Lord Hope to be for determination by that court and had 
nothing to do with the functions of the Scottish Ministers, 
the First Minister or the Lord Advocate.
The composition of the Judicial Committee in Brown v 
Stott is of particular interest in the context of the split in 
approach between the Scots and non-Scots judges which 
was revealed in Montgomery and Coulter. Again the two 
Scottish Law Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Clyde, were 
included on the Committee, but they were joined by a 
third Scottish judge, Lord Kirkwood, who was eligible toJo 7 T o
sit on the Judicial Committee by virtue of the recent 
appointment of Inner House judges to the rank of Privy 
Councillor. Thus, for the first time, Scottish judges made 
up a majority of the Judicial Committee, being joined in 
Brown v Stott by Lord Bingham and Lord Steyn. This time, 
the Committee were unanimous in deciding that the
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proposed acts of the Lord Advocate properly raised a 
devolution issue under reference to Article 6 fair trial 
rights.
Thus, in Brown v Stott, the disputed analysis of this issue 
by Lords Hope and Clyde in Montgomery and Coulter would 
seem to have prevailed over the approach of Lord 
Hoffmann, and the doubts expressed by Lord Slynn and 
Lord Nicholls in the earlier case. Had the Scots judges' 
analysis of what constitutes a devolution issue not been 
followed, and the Hoffmann approach preferred, the likely 
result would have been that Lord Justice-General Rodger's 
finding, backed as it was by an impressive citation and 
detailed critique of many Commonwealth and US 
authorities, as to the central and (almost) absolute nature
of the right against enforced self-incrimination implicit ino o r
Article 6 of the Convention would have prevailed in the 
context of the Scots criminal law and procedure. By 
contrast, it seems likely that the House of Lords in any 
criminal appeal in England would have followed the 
approach favoured by the pressure group JUSTICE (who 
were permitted to intervene in the Judicial Committee 
proceedings in Brown v Stott) and allowed the right to be 
limited in a proportionate manner for legitimate reasons. 
One suspects that it was precisely the possibility of such a 
major disparity of approach between the two jurisdictions, 
which drove Lord Hope's insistence (in the face of Lord 
Hoffmann's scepticism) as to the fair trial responsibilities 
of the Lord Advocate.
In HM Advocate v Mdntosh the Judicial Committee again 
included Lord Hope and Lord Clyde, but had a non- 
Scottish majority made up of Lord Bingham, Lord 
Hoffmann, and Lord Hutton. By this time, there was no 
dispute among any members of the Committee that the 
matter before it was properly to be characterised as a 
devolution issue. The leading speech was given by Lord 
Bingham and concurred with by the rest of the bench, with
o J '
only Lord Hope adding some brief additional observations 
on their decision (remarks which were also specifically 
concurred with by Lord Hoffmann). Again the decision of 
the Judicial Committee to over-rule the majority decision 
of the Scottish criminal appeal court brought Scottish 
criminal jurisprudence on the extent and effect of Article 
6(2) into line with England and Wales (as now seen in the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in R v 
Karl Benjafield and others, CA unreported, 21 December 
2000 at para. 69, also digested in [2000] Times Law Reports 
902) and ensured a uniformity of approach throughout the 
United Kingdom on the question of the confiscation of the 
alleged proceeds of drug trafficking.
CONCLUSION
Section 103 of the Scotland Act 1998, section 82 of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 and paragraph 32, Schedule 8 to 
the Government of Wales Act 1998, all assert the bindingJ ' o
nature of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in proceedings under the Act in all other courts 
and legal proceedings, apart from later cases brought 
before the Committee. These provision would appear to 
be intended to alter the general rule that the House of 
Lords in its judicial capacity is not bound by decisions of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council   see London 
joint Stock Bank v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 
807. It would seem that the purpose of this provision was 
to ensure uniformity of approach across the United 
Kingdom on matters of Convention rights, among others.
o o ' o
It is a provision the significance of which has apparently 
been little understood, because in effect it means that on 
questions of the effect and scope of Convention rights 
(which have been duly raised under the Devolution 
Statutes) the House of Lords has been superseded as the 
final court of appeal in the United Kingdom. This will 
come as a great shock to many English lawyers, who are 
currently engaged in litigation over Convention rightsJ o o o o
issues since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 
1998 in England at the beginning of October 2000. The
O O O
final court of appeal in civil and criminal matters for 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the House of Lords,
O ' 7 7
has itself been placed at level lower in the judicial hierarchy 
by another court, the Judicial Committee, which a 
developing constitutional convention seems to indicate 
will be a court composed substantially, (and at times by a 
majority) of Scots lawyers deciding cases brought primarily 
from Scotland.
The somewhat surprising (and surely unintended) result 
of this is an effective Scottish take-over of English law
O
when matters of Convention rights are raised, and theo '
exclusion of the vast majority of English lawyers and 
English judges from the constitutional process put in place 
to reach final and binding decisions on Convention points 
in the United Kingdom. Thus, while in December 2000, 
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales was, in the case 
of R v Karl Benjafield and others, CA unreported, 21 
December 2000 (digested in [2000] Times Law Reports 
902), considering the compatibility of property 
confiscation orders in drug trafficking cases with
o o
individuals' Convention rights, the final decision on this
o '
question of Convention compatibility was taken, not on 
any appeal by the parties to that case in the House of 
Lords, but by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the 
Scottish case of HM Advocate v Mdntosh, JCPC, unreported, 
5 February 2001 (accessible atwww.privy-council.org.uk/), 
which as we have seen reversed the majority finding of the 
High Court of Justiciary (sitting in Edinburgh as a court of 
criminal appeal) to the effect that the legal regime
governing such confiscation was incompatible with the fairo o r
trial requirements of Article 6 (see Mdntosh v HM Advocate, 
2000 SLT 1280, HCJ.
Similarly, in a series of conjoined judicial review 
applications (collectively known as Alconbury) which were 
heard before the High Court of England and Wales in
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December 2000   (1) R v Secretary of State for the 
Environment Transport and the Regions, ex parte Holding and 
Barnes pic, (2) R v Secretary Jor the Environment Transport and 
the Regions, ex parte Premier Leisure, (3) R v Secretary of State Jor 
the Environment Transport and the Regions, ex parte Alconbury 
Developments Limited, and (4) Secretary of State Jor the 
Environment Transport and the Regions v. Legal and General 
Assurance Limited, QBD unreported, 12 December 2000   
the question before Tuckey LJ and Harrison J was whether 
or not the processes by which the Secretary of State for 
Environment, Transport and the Regions makes decisions 
under the Town and Country Planning Act and Orders, under 
the Transport and Works Act 1992, the Highways Act 1980 and 
the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, were compatible with 
Article 6(1). Effectively the same issue arising under 
parallel Scottish planning legislation had already been 
raised and decided upon in October 2000 by Lord 
Macfadyen, sitting at first instance in the Scottish judicial 
review application County Properties Limited v The Scottish 
Ministers, 2000 SLT 965, OH.
The Divisional Court hearing the conjoined English and 
Welsh cases arrived at a similar conclusion to that which 
had already been reached in the Outer House in the 
Scottish case, namely that the existing planning procedures 
in relation to call-ins by the Secretary of State were 
incompatible with the Convention rights guaranteeing 
individuals access to an independent and impartial tribunal 
with full jurisdiction in the determination of their civil 
rights. The decision of Lord Macfadyen in County Properties 
was appealed against by the Scottish Ministers to three 
judges of the Inner House of the Court of Session. 
Meanwhile, however, the decision of the Division Court in 
the Alconbury application was allowed to leapfrog the Court 
of Appeal of England and Wales and be appealed directly 
to the House of Lords. But again, as a result of the new 
hierarchy of courts created by the Devolution Statutes, the 
final decision on this point cannot be made by the House 
of Lords judges in Alconbury: instead the House of Lords 
will have to defer on the Convention point issue to a 
decision of the Judicial Committee should an appeal 
against the decision of the Inner House in County Properties 
v Scottish Ministers be taken to the Privy Council. The 
Scottish Ministers have hedged their bets, however, in thato ' '
they have applied for and been given leave to intervene to 
argue their case before the House of Lords in Alconbury and 
thereby have afforded themselves two bites of the cherry, 
once before the House of Lord and once before the Privy 
Council   a privilege not afforded to County Properties 
Ltd. who brought the original judicial review application 
which sparked off the whole argument as to the reach of 
Article 6 in planning matters.
One cannot but feel that this kind of ad hoc 
constitutional structure will not prove to be an inherently 
stable one, particularly given that there are at least 
stateable arguments (which might be raised should, for
example, the Privy Council decision in Brown v Stott be 
taken by the accused to the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, or if County Properties Ltd. are 
themselves ultimately unsuccessful before the Privy 
Council and decide to take the matter further) to the effect 
that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council does not 
itself conform to the requirements of the Convention, in 
particular Article 6(1), as regards having the appearance of 
being 'an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law'. On the requirements for an tribunal to have the 
appearance of independence and impartiality see the 
decision of the Scottish Criminal appeal court in Starrs and 
another v Ruxton (Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow), 2000 JC 208, 
HCJ (commented upon in Aidan O'Neill QC 'The 
European Convention and the Independence of the 
Judiciary   the Scottish Experience' (2000) 63 Modern Law 
Review 429).
The question must arise as to whether the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (whose members qua 
Privy Councillors are appointed solely at the pleasure of 
the Crown, without formal grant or letters patents, who 
may be removed or dismissed from the Privy Council at 
the pleasure of the monarch   albeit on advice from the 
Prime Minister   simply by striking their names from the 
Privy Council book) do themselves satisfy the Article 6(1) 
requirements, as understood by the European Court of 
Human Rights, of the appearance of an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law   see, amongst others, 
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in 
McGonnell v United Kingdom, unreported, 8 February 2000 
(accessible at www.dhcour.coe,fr/hudoc and digested in 
[2000] Times Law Reports 119) and Wille v Liechtenstein, 
unreported, 28 October 1999, (accessible at 
www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc).
Ultimately, it is suggested, the logic of the on-going 
constitutional change will require the setting up a properly 
established constitutional court for the United Kingdom, 
with properly identified, tenured and explicitly 
independent judges, perhaps appointed after 
parliamentary hearings along the lines of the US Supreme 
Court. The genie of constitutional reform is out of the 
bottle and has acquired its own dynamic. It would appear 
we have not completed the task of writing the constitution.
This article is an updated version of the piece which 
appeared in the January 2001 issue (vol. 46, no. 1) of The 
Journal of the Law Society of Scotland. A fuller version will be 
published later this year in the Modern Law Review. ®
Aidan O'Neill QC
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